In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE __decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write. An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670! [ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ]
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| linux | linux kernel | a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, a303bb0e58345fe9f7ab2f82b90266f2b5036058, 4.13 |
Downstream vendors/products affected by this vulnerability
| Vendor | Product | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| open source | open source linux kernel | cert_advisory | 90% |
Loading…
